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“Germany is often expected to help finance transitions like these, but debates continue even within Germany itself. The economies of countries like Slovakia and Hungary are deeply connected to the European market, and we should accept that reality.”
“Countries like Türkiye and Hungary continue buying Russian gas because it’s cheaper,” he stated. “This has long been a topic of discussion in Europe. We know that the EU doesn’t have a unified foreign policy. Countries like Hungary and Serbia are following their own political strategies during the war in Ukraine. So is Türkiye.”
“There are not only political reasons behind the continuation of Russian gas imports,” he said. “Economic factors are also very influential.”
“Türkiye is observing the process from a realpolitik perspective,” Özdil said. “One of the most strategic moves was supplying advanced drone systems to Ukraine during the war. Western European experts agree on this point.”
“Türkiye is highly experienced in developing energy infrastructure,” he continued. “Consider the Iraq–Türkiye oil pipeline, the Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum gas pipeline, the TANAP project, the TAP project with Greece and other Eastern European countries, the Blue Stream project, and the TurkStream project. Türkiye uses energy as a form of soft power.”
“Even though TANAP is a major entry point for TAP, Türkiye never delayed the construction process or used it as political leverage,” he said. “That was a highly strategic project. If Russian gas flow had stopped, there would have been no viable alternative. LNG imports through Türkiye could not meet demand at sufficient levels.”
“Türkiye’s daily capacity is about 150 million cubic meters,” Özdil explained. “We can only compare that with countries like Spain or the UK. That’s why Türkiye will remain a critical gas entry point for Eastern Europe. If the EU continues distancing itself from Russian energy, Türkiye’s role will grow stronger.”
“Türkiye is getting closer to the strategic role it has long sought in European energy security,” said Özdil. “But we need to distinguish between being a transit country and a true energy hub.”
“Ukraine has a long-standing policy of opposing Russian pipelines that bypass its territory,” Özdil stated. “Its opposition to Nord Stream 1 and 2, as well as TurkStream 1 and 2, stems from fears of losing its transit role. It used to generate revenue from gas transit.”
“Around 35 billion cubic meters of Russian gas were still flowing to Europe through Ukraine, even during the war,” he added. “This isn’t widely discussed in Western media, but the fact remains that the EU continued importing gas from a country in active conflict.”
“I would prefer not to speculate about alleged attacks on TurkStream,” Özdil said. “As far as we know, no confirmed incidents have occurred. These claims have not been substantiated, and for now, they remain speculative.”
“Russia has two main LNG exporters: Novatek and Gazprom,” Özdil said. “Novatek also includes Gazprom as a shareholder, but other actors are involved too. Since the EU shifted toward LNG to replace pipeline gas, imports of Russian LNG have increased.” “Do I see this as a contradiction? To some extent, yes.”
