An ancient trade route is coming back once more at the crossroads of continents. As China advances its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) across Eurasia, Türkiye is positioning itself in the Middle Corridor (MC), an ambitious route linking East and West through railways, ports, and pipelines. More than just infrastructure, this strategic alignment reflects shared aspirations for economic growth, regional leadership, and geopolitical relevance.
Yet as hopes rise, so do questions: "Can Türkiye transform into a central Eurasian hub, or will modest investment flows and asymmetrical power dynamics limit the corridor’s promise?" In the shadow of Beijing’s grand strategy, the Middle Corridor may prove to be not just a complement but a quiet counterweight.
Unlike the Northern Corridor through Russia or the Southern Corridor via Iran, the Middle Corridor stretches across Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, and Türkiye before reaching Europe. This route has gained prominence due to shifting global trade dynamics, particularly in light of geopolitical tensions in the wake of the war in Ukraine and the disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.
China’s reliance on the Northern Corridor has been disrupted by the war in Ukraine, making alternative trade routes more appealing. The Middle Corridor, supported by Türkiye and regional players such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, offers a shorter and less politically sensitive path to Europe.
The middle corridor has been envisioned since the 1990s as a revival of the Silk Road and is structured around both logistical and political motivations, including the transportation of Caspian hydrocarbon resources. The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway and Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) are essential elements of this vision, supported by trilateral agreements and sister port initiatives. Türkiye's efforts were solidified through cooperation agreements with China, such as the 2015 MoU aligning the middle corridor with the BRI, enhancing political commitment.
Türkiye sees the Middle Corridor not only as a transport link but also as a pathway to regional influence, domestic economic development, and opportunity. With massive infrastructure investments, including the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway, the Marmaray tunnel under the Bosphorus, the Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge, and the Edirne-Kars High-Speed Train, Türkiye seeks to integrate itself more fully into global value chains and have strengthened the country’s position as a major logistics hub.
Trade volume along the Middle Corridor grew by 10% between 2021 and 2022, driven by shifts in regional and intercontinental trade patterns, according to the World Bank data. The Turkish government sees this as a chance to solidify its role in global trade while reducing dependency on Western markets.
The Middle Corridor represents a strategic alternative to reliance on routes controlled by Russia or Iran. By strengthening its own logistics infrastructure and reducing dependency on northern and southern routes, Türkiye aims to position itself as a key Eurasian hub. Furthermore, the middle corridor has the potential to serve as a catalyst for cultural diplomacy, connecting Turkic states in Central Asia with Türkiye through trade and identity.
These investments serve multiple objectives: connecting Europe and Asia, enhancing domestic logistics capacity, and promoting regional cultural ties. Türkiye’s integration into global markets via transport corridors is envisioned not only to boost trade but also to attract foreign investment and create jobs.
According to World Bank’s recent data, between 2021 and 2022, trade volume along the Middle Corridor grew by 10% (in tons), primarily driven by shifts in regional and intercontinental trade dynamics. The Turkish government sees this as a chance to strengthen its role in regional trade, reducing dependency on Western markets.
China initially prioritized the Northern Corridor but has shown growing interest in the middle corridor due to geopolitical shifts and logistical vulnerabilities, including the Ukraine conflict and instability in maritime shipping lanes. However, China remains cautious. Despite signing an MoU with Türkiye to align the BRI with the Middle Corridor in 2015, Chinese investment in Türkiye remains limited. While some strategic investments have been made in the Middle Corridor, the majority of BRI funding still favors sea and rail routes where Beijing retains more control.
Chinese foreign direct investment in Türkiye accounts for less than 1% of total FDI. Many Chinese firms in Türkiye operate in low-value-added sectors, such as wholesale trade, mining, and basic manufacturing. While major projects (e.g., the Marmaray and Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge) received Chinese financing or involvement, small and medium-sized investments remain scattered and modest.
Moreover, some investments appear to prioritize Chinese export interests over local industrial development. While Türkiye has signed agreements to promote local production and research partnerships with Chinese companies (e.g., Huawei and Xiaomi), these have not yet produced substantial results in technology transfer or employment.
Despite being the longest, the Northern Corridor boasts the shortest average transit time at 14 days. The Middle Corridor, while geographically shorter, takes between 13 and 21 days under optimal conditions, though delays can extend transit times to 60 days. Meanwhile, the Southern Corridor’s transit time ranges from 25 to 30 days.
Türkiye has made notable efforts to deepen financial ties with China in recent years, including striking currency swap deals and welcoming major Chinese banks like the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). But the trade relationship remains unbalanced. In 2018, Türkiye imported more than $20 billion worth of goods from China, while exports to the country totaled under $3 billion.
It is confirmed that the nature of Chinese investment does little to alleviate this deficit. Many investments are geared towards the marketing of Chinese products rather than fostering local industrial capacity. The lack of high-value-added partnerships has thus far limited developmental benefits.
Also, over half of Chinese-invested firms in Türkiye operate in sectors such as wholesale and low-tech manufacturing, while greenfield investments and R&D partnerships are rare. This structure raises concerns about Türkiye becoming an extension of Chinese distribution networks rather than an equal industrial partner.
A key question remains: Will China fully embrace the Middle Corridor as a viable alternative, or will it continue to prioritize its own logistical dominance?
The MC incorporates critical infrastructure projects such as the BTK railway, the Lapis Lazuli corridor, and regional port integrations. Projects like the Eurasia Tunnel, Istanbul Airport, the Filyos Port, and the Marmaray as examples of Türkiye's commitment to becoming a logistics hub. These efforts are complemented by cultural and diplomatic initiatives such as the Organization of Turkic States.
Türkiye also aims to strengthen transport links through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan, connecting ports such as Baku and Aktau. These cross-border linkages, supported by multilateral frameworks, improve cargo flow efficiency and reduce dependency on unstable regions. However, bureaucratic hurdles, variable tariffs, and non-tariff barriers still hinder seamless transit.
While the Middle Corridor presents a promising alternative, challenges remain. Infrastructure bottlenecks, high transit costs, and fragmented customs procedures in Central Asia pose significant hurdles. Despite its strategic potential, the Middle Corridor faces significant challenges: infrastructural gaps, customs inefficiencies, and complex geopolitical dynamics. Fragmented cooperation among Central Asian countries and competition from both Northern and Southern routes add further pressure.
However, with the European Union seeking to reduce dependency on Russian trade routes, both Türkiye and China may find common ground in further developing this corridor. If successfully integrated into the Belt and Road framework, the Middle Corridor could redefine Eurasian trade for decades to come.
Furthermore, exaggerated expectations surrounding Chinese involvement may lead to disappointment unless institutional frameworks improve. Local political risks, especially after the coup attempt in 2016, also contribute to investment volatility.
Additionally, concerns about transparency and debt sustainability have emerged. While Türkiye has secured financing from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), reliance on external credit poses risks if investments do not generate anticipated returns. The uneven nature of project distribution and weak monitoring mechanisms may reduce long-term effectiveness.
Cultural integration has been a parallel dimension of the BRI-MC relationship. Confucius Institutes in Türkiye, Yunus Emre Centers in China, and mutual tourism years exemplify this. These initiatives promote soft power and people-to-people bonds essential for long-term cooperation.
Beyond symbolic gestures, academic and vocational training partnerships can deepen bilateral ties. For instance, technical training programs co-funded by Chinese firms and Turkish universities could enhance local capabilities and reduce dependence on foreign labor or know-how. So far, such initiatives remain underdeveloped.
Chinese foreign direct investment in Türkiye has remained modest compared to that from Western countries. While Türkiye has received some Chinese capital in sectors like energy and transportation, these investments are often characterized by a top-down approach and limited local integration. Unlike Africa and Southeast Asia, where Chinese firms pursue raw materials and infrastructure, or Europe, where the focus is on high-tech manufacturing and logistics, Türkiye has struggled to define a clear strategic role within the BRI framework. The scale and developmental impact of Chinese investments remain below expectations.
The Middle Corridor presents Türkiye with a chance to elevate its geoeconomic role by aligning with the BRI. It could shorten trade routes, boost regional ties, and support infrastructure goals. But for this potential to materialize, Türkiye must ensure regulatory clarity, address trade imbalances, and embrace technological cooperation.
Success hinges on aligning national ambitions with regional coordination and global investment. The Corridor could symbolize a fair, strategic partnership if built not just on roads and railways, but also on institutional strength, data transparency, and mutual trust. A cautious, coordinated optimism will be key to shaping the next chapter of China-Türkiye relations.
