By Ahmetcan Uzlaşık | Curated by Ömer Sirkecioğlu
Since 2022, the European Union has endeavored to sever its reliance on Russian natural gas. Despite the implementation of 17 sanction packages over three years, Russian gas continues to flow into Europe via the TurkStream pipeline, undermining the EU's decoupling efforts.
On January 1, 2025, a significant shift occurred when the transit agreement between Ukraine's Naftogaz and Russia's Gazprom expired, halting Russian gas transit through Ukraine. This cessation, coupled with the incapacitation of the Yamal-Europe and Nord Stream pipelines due to geopolitical tensions and infrastructure damage, has left TurkStream as the sole operational route for Russian pipeline gas exports to Europe.
Beyond its energy role, TurkStream also plays into broader regional dynamics. For Ankara, it reinforces its position as a key energy transit country. For Russia, it provides a remaining outlet to European consumers. And for the EU, it presents a challenge, balancing energy security with political goals.
On May 6, 2025, the European Commission unveiled a new roadmap aimed at fully ending the EU’s dependence on Russian energy imports, targeting gas, oil, and nuclear fuel. Member states are expected to submit national exit strategies by the end of 2025.
Stretching 930 kilometers beneath the Black Sea from Anapa, Russia, to Kıyıköy, Türkiye, TurkStream has emerged as a critical infrastructure link between Russian gas reserves and Southeast Europe. Launched in 2020, the pipeline delivers up to 31.5 billion cubic meters of gas per year, split between Türkiye’s domestic supply and European markets.
TurkStream has supplied over 63 billion cubic meters of Russian gas to the EU since its launch, bringing in more than 20 billion euros (around $22.72 billion) for Gazprom. The pipeline serves as a key energy source for Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania, Moldova, North Macedonia, Bosnia, Hungary, and Slovakia.
In the first quarter of 2025, Gazprom's exports via TurkStream totaled approximately 4.5 billion cubic meters (bcm), marking a 16% increase compared to the same period in 2024. However, March 2025 saw a 19.4% month-on-month decline in daily exports, averaging 45 million cubic meters per day, down from 55.8 million cubic meters in February. This decline reduced the pipeline's utilization rate to 80% in March, compared to 98% in February.
Since early 2025, the TurkStream pipeline has become a flashpoint in the evolving energy and security debate across Europe. Russia claims Ukraine has launched multiple drone attacks targeting compressor stations along the route. Kyiv has not confirmed the accusations, but the incidents have reignited concerns about the vulnerability of cross-border energy infrastructure. Hungary, heavily reliant on TurkStream, has urged the EU to ensure such routes remain protected.
Meanwhile, U.S.-based hedge fund Elliott Investment Management, led by billionaire Paul Singer, is reportedly exploring a stake in Bulgaria’s TurkStream extension and related infrastructure, a move that could reshape the geopolitical dynamics around the pipeline.
Several other sabotage incidents have targeted Nord Stream 1 and 2 since the outbreak of the war.
Over three years after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU cut its pipeline gas imports from over 40% in 2021 to 11% in 2024. However, the situation is different with Hungary and Slovakia.
According to The Last Mile report by CREA and the Center for the Study of Democracy, while most EU countries drastically cut Russian pipeline gas imports after the Ukraine invasion, Hungary and Slovakia went in the opposite direction. Their gas imports from Russia dropped just 5.5% between 2021 and 2024, compared to an 81% average drop across the EU. Despite an overall 23% decrease in domestic gas use, their reliance on Russian supply rose from 57% to 70%, exposing both nations to potential energy coercion. The report estimates they spent nearly €20 billion on Russian gas in this period.
Hungary has significantly increased its imports of Russian gas through the TurkStream pipeline, going against the broader EU trend of reducing dependence.
By 2025, Hungary has become the top importer of Russian gas, with imports projected to increase to approximately 8 billion cubic meters, up from 6 billion cubic meters in 2023.
Following a 15-year agreement with Gazprom signed in 2021, Hungary raised its intake to cover the entirety of domestic demand, with volumes rising further in 2023 and 2024. The government has also expanded its role as a transit country, re-exporting gas to Slovakia and other neighbors.
While the EU has invested in LNG terminals and alternative routes, Hungary has opted for long-term deals via TurkStream, citing cost and supply security. According to EU customs data, Russian pipeline gas delivered through TurkStream in 2024 was priced 13–15% below other available sources for EU buyers.
Slovakia has increased its dependence on Russian gas via the TurkStream corridor, mainly through Hungary. After the Ukraine transit route ended in 2024, Slovakia’s state-owned supplier SPP secured expanded capacity through Hungary, raising imports to 3.5 bcm annually.
In January 2025, Prime Minister Robert Fico met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Ankara to discuss long-term energy cooperation. Erdoğan offered to mediate with Moscow and pledged to involve both Turkish and Russian foreign ministers to ensure reliable gas deliveries to Slovakia. Fico highlighted the possibility of routing supplies through TurkStream and onward via Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary.
As the EU cuts down gas pipelines, Russia-owned LNG still flows to the continent.
In 2024, the EU imports of Russian LNG hit a record high rising to 16.65 million tonnes, even as overall LNG imports fell 20%. Much of this gas is sold on the spot market, where it undercuts U.S. prices. As Brussels prepares a ban on transshipments via EU ports, analysts warn it could backfire, keeping more Russian LNG in Europe rather than rerouting it elsewhere.
“We shouldn’t view the European Union as a single entity when it comes to gas consumption,” said energy expert Eser Özdil. “Eastern and Western Europe have different options for gas imports. Western countries can access alternatives like LNG, Norwegian gas, or Algerian gas with relative ease. But for countries in Eastern Europe, such as Bulgaria, Hungary, Serbia, and North Macedonia, diversifying gas sources is much more difficult.”
“Hungary is in the most vulnerable position,” he added. “A large portion of the gas coming through TurkStream’s second line goes to countries with limited diversification options. Hungary, Serbia, and others are central here. In the short term, they will continue relying on this gas. Based on existing agreements with Türkiye, their imports may even increase. That’s why it’s important to recognize the difference between Eastern and Western Europe’s positions.”
“Germany is often expected to help finance transitions like these, but debates continue even within Germany itself. The economies of countries like Slovakia and Hungary are deeply connected to the European market, and we should accept that reality.”
“Countries like Türkiye and Hungary continue buying Russian gas because it’s cheaper,” he stated. “This has long been a topic of discussion in Europe. We know that the EU doesn’t have a unified foreign policy. Countries like Hungary and Serbia are following their own political strategies during the war in Ukraine. So is Türkiye.”
“There are not only political reasons behind the continuation of Russian gas imports,” he said. “Economic factors are also very influential.”
“Türkiye is observing the process from a realpolitik perspective,” Özdil said. “One of the most strategic moves was supplying advanced drone systems to Ukraine during the war. Western European experts agree on this point.”
“Türkiye is highly experienced in developing energy infrastructure,” he continued. “Consider the Iraq–Türkiye oil pipeline, the Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum gas pipeline, the TANAP project, the TAP project with Greece and other Eastern European countries, the Blue Stream project, and the TurkStream project. Türkiye uses energy as a form of soft power.”
“Even though TANAP is a major entry point for TAP, Türkiye never delayed the construction process or used it as political leverage,” he said. “That was a highly strategic project. If Russian gas flow had stopped, there would have been no viable alternative. LNG imports through Türkiye could not meet demand at sufficient levels.”
“Türkiye’s daily capacity is about 150 million cubic meters,” Özdil explained. “We can only compare that with countries like Spain or the UK. That’s why Türkiye will remain a critical gas entry point for Eastern Europe. If the EU continues distancing itself from Russian energy, Türkiye’s role will grow stronger.”
“Türkiye is getting closer to the strategic role it has long sought in European energy security,” said Özdil. “But we need to distinguish between being a transit country and a true energy hub.”
“Ukraine has a long-standing policy of opposing Russian pipelines that bypass its territory,” Özdil stated. “Its opposition to Nord Stream 1 and 2, as well as TurkStream 1 and 2, stems from fears of losing its transit role. It used to generate revenue from gas transit.”
“Around 35 billion cubic meters of Russian gas were still flowing to Europe through Ukraine, even during the war,” he added. “This isn’t widely discussed in Western media, but the fact remains that the EU continued importing gas from a country in active conflict.”
“I would prefer not to speculate about alleged attacks on TurkStream,” Özdil said. “As far as we know, no confirmed incidents have occurred. These claims have not been substantiated, and for now, they remain speculative.”
“Russia has two main LNG exporters: Novatek and Gazprom,” Özdil said. “Novatek also includes Gazprom as a shareholder, but other actors are involved too. Since the EU shifted toward LNG to replace pipeline gas, imports of Russian LNG have increased.” “Do I see this as a contradiction? To some extent, yes.”
